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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 E.D., a female immigration detainee at the Berks 
County Residential Center -Immigration Family Center 
(BCRC), brought a § 1983 action against employee Daniel 
Sharkey, alleging that he violated her Fourteenth Amendment 
right to bodily integrity after the two had sexual relations.  
Included in the suit were Sharkey’s co-workers and supervisor 
at BCRC (collectively, the “Defendants”), who E.D. alleged 
were deliberately indifferent to the violation, as well as Berks 
County, which allegedly failed to implement policies to 
prevent the violating conduct.  The Defendants and Berks 
County moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
individual staff members were entitled to qualified immunity 
and that E.D. could not prove a municipal liability claim 
against the County.  The District Court denied their motion, 
and they have filed this interlocutory appeal.1 
 In determining whether to affirm the denial of qualified 
immunity, we necessarily address whether immigration 
detainees are entitled to the same constitutional protections 
afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as pre-trial detainees.  We hold that immigration 
detainees are entitled to such protections and, for the reasons 
that follow, will dismiss the appeal pertaining to Berks County 
for lack of appellate jurisdiction and will affirm the denial of 
the Defendants’ request for qualified immunity.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
                                                            
1 In the same order, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants John Behm and the BCRC, 
and granted judgment in favor of Berks County with regard to 
claims for punitive damages against the County.  No appeal 
arose from these rulings.  
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 E.D. entered the United States with her three-year-old 
son in or around May 2014, seeking refuge from domestic 
violence and sexual assault in Honduras.  She and her son were 
transferred from an immigration facility in Texas to the BCRC, 
which detains approximately ninety women and children 
pursuant to a contract with United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).  
 Approximately a month after E.D.’s arrival, BCRC 
employee Daniel Sharkey began giving food and treats to E.D. 
and her son.  His overtures escalated to allowing E.D. to use 
his cell phone and promising to help with her immigration 
status.  Within weeks Sharkey began to touch and kiss E.D., 
who refused to reciprocate.  He turned angry, insulted E.D., 
and told her she would be deported if she told anyone about his 
advances.  
 In July 2014, Sharkey began forcing E.D. to engage in 
sexual intercourse.  On one occasion they had intercourse in a 
bathroom and a seven-year-old girl witnessed the encounter.  
In August 2014, E.D. and Sharkey were having intercourse in 
another resident’s room when the resident returned.  Within the 
month, Sharkey either left or was terminated from his 
employment at BCRC.  He was later arrested and convicted of 
institutional sexual assault under Pennsylvania statute 18 
Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2, which was enacted in February 2012.  
 E.D. alleges that, by August 2014, staff members at the 
BCRC were aware of Sharkey’s conduct but failed to take steps 
to protect her.  Eventually detainees complained and BCRC 
Director Diane Edwards was notified of the relationship.  An 
investigation was launched.  When questioned by staff 
members, E.D. denied Sharkey had sexually assaulted her 
because she feared deportation. E.D. eventually told her 
immigration attorney about Sharkey’s conduct, and her 
attorney relayed the incidents to ICE officials.  E.D. alleges 
that, after the relationship was reported, the defendant BCRC 
staff members retaliated by denying her and her son privileges 
and instituting a restrictive clothing policy that led to other 
detainees isolating her.  
 According to E.D., ICE policies and standards prohibit 
staff from sexually abusing immigration detainees and define 
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any sexual contact, regardless of whether it is consensual, as 
sexual abuse.  Moreover, ICE standards require that the Field 
Office Director be notified any time an employee, contractor, 
or volunteer is alleged to be a perpetrator of sexual abuse 
against a detainee.  The ICE/DRO (Detention and Removal 
Operations) Residential Standards require residential facilities 
holding immigration detainees to affirmatively act to prevent 
sexual abuse and sexual assault of the residents, which includes 
providing staff training and prompt, effective intervention.   
 In June 2017, E.D. filed her third amended complaint in 
District Court against Daniel Sharkey, Berks County, the 
BCRC, the center’s director Diane Edwards, and staff 
members John Behm, Janie Himmelberger, Brittany 
Rothermel, Erika Taylor, and Matthew Malinowski.2  E.D. 
claimed, inter alia, that her Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights were violated by the employees and supervisor 
who were deliberately indifferent to Sharkey’s conduct and by 
Berks County for failing to implement policies and procedures 
to prevent sexual abuse at the residential center. She further 
alleged that the Defendants retaliated against her after she 
reported the sexual abuse, thereby violating her due process 
and First Amendment rights. After the completion of 
discovery, all the defendants except for Daniel Sharkey moved 
for summary judgment.   
 The District Court granted the defendants’ joint motion 
with regard to claims against the BCRC, ruling that it was not 
a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it did not 
have an existence separate from Berks County.  The Court also 
granted summary judgment in favor of BCRC employee John 
Behm and rejected E.D.’s claims for punitive damages against 
Berks County, but otherwise denied the motion.  The 
remaining defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging 
the District Court’s conclusion that E.D. pled the violation of a 
known constitutional right, that the BCRC employees and 
supervisor were not entitled to qualified immunity, and that a 
                                                            
2 E.D.’s third complaint included Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) agent Josh Petry as a defendant, but the 




factfinder could reasonably find Berks County liable for 
Sharkey’s conduct.    
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 Generally, our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 is limited to appeals of District Courts’ final orders.  The 
denial of a motion for summary judgment, which allows an 
issue to proceed to trial, is generally not considered a final 
order.  Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 781-82 (3d Cir. 2003).  
However, section 1291 does allow interlocutory review of 
certain collateral orders because they “finally determine claims 
of right . . . too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”  
Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).   
 Orders denying qualified immunity are eligible for 
review under the “collateral-order doctrine” because qualified 
immunity entitles the defendant to “immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense to liability and [the entitlement] is 
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” 
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 572 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985)) 
(emphasis in original and alterations omitted).  However, the 
denial of qualified immunity can be reviewed only to the extent 
that the analysis denying the defense turns on an issue of law.  
Id.; Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 364 (3d Cir. 2012).  In these 
instances, where the issue appealed concerns not whether the 
parties might be able to prove given facts but rather whether 
the facts show a violation of clearly established law, we have 
jurisdiction “but we must adopt the facts assumed by the 
District Court.” Walker v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995)).  In 
deciding the summary judgment motion, the District Court 
must accept as true the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all 
reasonable inferences from the record in the nonmovant’s 
favor.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014).   




 In deciding that Sharkey’s co-workers and supervisor 
were not entitled to qualified immunity, the District Court 
concluded that E.D. sufficiently alleged a violation of a 
constitutional right and that the right was clearly established.  
See L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 240-41 (3d Cir. 
2016).  On appeal, the Defendants challenge the conclusion 
that E.D.’s evidence of Sharkey’s conduct raised such a 
violation.  In so doing, they raise an appealable issue of law.  
We exercise plenary review over questions of law raised by the 
denial of qualified immunity.  Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 
320 F.3d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Eddy v. Virgin Islands 
Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
b. No jurisdiction to review denial of summary 
judgment for Berks County. 
 We do not have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s order denying summary judgment in favor of Berks 
County.  Unlike the individual Defendants, Berks County 
cannot assert a qualified immunity defense, and the denial of 
summary judgment to Berks County therefore does not trigger 
collateral order doctrine review.  See Owner v. City of 
Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (under § 1983, a 
municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity from liability 
for violations of constitutional rights).  The District Court 
denied summary judgment because it determined that the 
County’s liability depended on the resolution of issues of 
material fact, which must be determined by a fact-finder.   To 
the extent the County asserts the District Court erred in 
identifying facts to support its order denying summary 
judgment, this argument must be made in an appeal following 
the conclusion of the case.  Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 
313 F.3d at 147-48 (citing Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 
57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002)).   
III. The Denial of Qualified Immunity for the Individual 
Defendants 
 Having ascertained that we have jurisdiction to review 
the denial of qualified immunity insofar as it raises a question 
of law, we now assess whether the District Court properly 
concluded that E.D. sufficiently pled the violation of a known 
constitutional right of which a reasonable person would be 
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aware.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001) (citations 
omitted).  While the plaintiff must sufficiently plead a 
violation, the burden is on the defendants to establish they are 
entitled to qualified immunity. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 
F.3d 120, 142 n. 15 (3d Cir. 2001).  Officials demonstrate they 
are entitled to qualified immunity only if they can show that a 
reasonable person in their position at the relevant time could 
have believed, in light of clearly established law, that their 
conduct comported with recognized legal standards. Id. 
 The District Court determined that E.D. sufficiently 
alleged a plausible violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right to bodily integrity, which it defined as “the right 
to have a custodial government officer protect an immigration 
detainee from sexual assault of which the officer is aware.”  It 
further determined this right to be clearly established at the 
time of Sharkey’s challenged conduct. The Court denied the 
individual Defendants qualified immunity because they failed 
to demonstrate their conduct comported with established legal 
standards, which would have required proving that they were 
either unaware of Sharkey’s conduct or they were aware but 
acted reasonably to protect E.D. from the assault.  We agree 
with the District Court that the Defendants did not meet this 
burden, and therefore affirm the denial of summary judgment. 
a. Alleged violation of constitutional right. 
 This Circuit has longed viewed the legal rights of an 
immigration detainee to be analogous to those of a pretrial 
detainee. 3   We now join a number of our sister Circuits in 
expressly holding that immigration detainees are entitled to the 
same due process protections.  Charles v. Orange County, --- 
F.3d ---, 2019 WL 2236391 (2d Cir. May 24, 2019); Chavero-
                                                            
3 Panels of this Circuit have repeatedly held in unpublished 
decisions that an immigration detainee is the equivalent of a 
pretrial detainee, and that a pretrial detainee’s constitutional 
claims are considered under the Due Process Clause: Adekoya 
v. Chertoff, 431 Fed. Appx. 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2011); Contant v. 
Sabol, 431 Fed. App’x. 177, 178 (3d Cir. 2011); Foreman v. 
Lowe, 261 Fed. App’x. 401, 403 (3d Cir. 2008); Harvey v. 
Chertoff, 263 Fed. App’x. 188, 191 (3d Cir. 2008); Dhalan v. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 215 F. App’x. 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 
2013); Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000).  
 “[W]hen pretrial detainees challenge their conditions of 
confinement, we must consider whether there has been a 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 
2008).   “In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or 
restrictions of pretrial detention that implicated only the 
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of 
law, we think the proper inquiry is whether those conditions 
amount to punishment of the detainee.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 535 (1979).  Under the Due Process clause, “a 
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.” 
Id.  To determine whether challenged conditions of 
confinement amount to punishment, this Court determines 
whether a condition of confinement is reasonably related to a 
legitimate governmental objective; if it is not, we may infer 
“that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that 
may not be constitutionally inflicted upon detainees qua 
detainees.” Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. 
at 539) (emphasis in original). 
 The right to “not be sexually assaulted by a state 
employee while in confinement” was clearly established at the 
time of Sharkey’s conduct.  Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 143 
n.15 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994), 
and Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 
(3d Cir. 1989)).  E.D.’s allegations of Sharkey’s sexual assault, 
which could not have served a legitimate governmental 
objective and thereby constituted impermissible punishment, 
set forth a plausible violation of her right to personal bodily 
integrity protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535); Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 
185, 192 (3d Cir. 2018).   
 Regarding Sharkey’s co-workers’ liability, this Court 
has recognized a detainee’s right to be protected by state actors 
who knew of ongoing violating conduct under the theory that 
a reasonable state official “could not believe that [their] actions 
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comported with clearly established law while also believing 
that there is an excessive risk to the plaintiffs and failing to 
adequately respond to that risk.”  Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 
143 n.15; see also Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 479 (3d Cir. 
2018) (holding that a prison guard who knows of, but fails to 
stop, ongoing constitutional violations against a prisoner 
violates the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights).  Supervisor 
Diane Edwards’ claim for immunity was properly denied 
because this Court has recognized the right to have state 
supervisory officials that neither condone nor authorize, 
through either their actions or inactions, sexual assault 
committed by another state actor.  See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 
730-731 (reversing the grant of qualified immunity where 
plaintiff proffered a “tenable theory” that supervisors’ 
practices amounted to condoning teacher’s sexual abuse of 
student).  We therefore agree with the District Court that E.D.’s 
claims against the individual Defendants alleged the violation 
of a known constitutional right.  
b. Alleged constitutional right clearly established.  
 We further agree that a detainee’s right to be protected 
by state officials aware of ongoing sexual assault was clearly 
established at the time of Sharkey’s conduct.  “A clearly 
established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would have understood that what he is 
doing violates that right.” Kane, 902 F.3d at 194 (citing 
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).  “[I]t need not 
be the case that the exact conduct has previously been held 
unlawful so long as the ‘contours of the right’ are sufficiently 
clear.”  Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).   
 Initially, the District Court fittingly recognized that 
Sharkey’s conduct was illegal in the state in which it occurred.  
He committed institutional sexual assault in violation of 
Pennsylvania Statute 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2, which forbids an 
employee of a “residential facility serving children and youth” 
from having sexual intercourse with a “detainee,” regardless of 
whether the detainee gave consent. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2 (a).  
That Sharkey’s conduct was illegal renders E.D.’s right to be 
free from sexual assault “so ‘obvious’ that it could be deemed 
clearly established even without materially similar cases.”  
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Kane, 902 F.3d at 195 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 
741 (2002)).   
 In any event, there is a materially similar case, decided 
twelve years before E.D. had entered the country.  In 2001 this 
Court held that juvenile detention facility employees could be 
liable for their co-worker’s sexual conduct with an inmate if 
they knew of but ignored the risk their co-worker posed.  
Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 135.   This same opinion held that 
facility supervisors could be liable for implementing deficient 
policies that created an unreasonable risk of a violation if they 
were aware of but indifferent to the risk, and the injury resulted 
from their own deficient policies.  Id.  Thus, the BCRC 
Defendants had notice that Sharkey’s conduct was violative, 
and their purported failure to intervene and protect E.D. could 
be found to have violated her right to be free of sexual assault, 
of which a reasonable person would have been aware.   
 On appeal, the individual Defendants argue E.D. failed 
to allege a constitutional right violation because the sexual 
intercourse between Sharkey and E.D. was consensual.  They 
further claim that the BCRC was “drastically different” from a 
prison, and that Sharkey was “not akin to a prison guard.” We 
agree with the District Court that the evidence regarding 
whether the sexual intercourse was consensual “presents a 
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury,” and 
therefore constitutes a genuine dispute of material fact.  Liberty 
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52.   
 However, given the findings of the District Court, 
which we adopt when reviewing the denial of summary 
judgment, we question whether the issue of consent will be 
deemed relevant at trial.  Schieber v. City of Phila., 320 F.3d at 
415.  The Court found that E.D. was “detained” and that, under 
ICE policies and standards, as well as Pennsylvania law, any 
sexual contact between a staff member and a detainee 
constitutes sexual abuse regardless of consent. We find, 
therefore, the Court’s factual findings support its ruling that 
E.D. sufficiently pled a due process rights violation by alleging 
she and Sharkey had sexual contact, notwithstanding its 
finding that whether she consented to the contact is in dispute.  
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IV. Deliberate Indifference Sufficiently Alleged 
 Having established that E.D. sufficiently alleged the 
violation of a known constitutional right, we now assess the 
District Court’s finding that she sufficiently established the 
Defendants “knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an 
objectively intolerable risk of harm” embodied by their co-
worker, Daniel Sharkey.  Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 132 
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (1994)).  In determining 
whether E.D. met her burden in pleading that the Defendants 
possessed a culpable state of mind and failed to act reasonably, 
she is entitled as the non-movant to the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence.  Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 
F.3d 742, 748 (3d. Cir. 1997). 
  Defendants argue on appeal that the evidence 
established they knew nothing of the ongoing sexual 
relationship, whereas E.D. argues the record proves the BCRC 
staff knew of Sharkey’s violative conduct and they were 
therefore required by law to protect her.  The District Court 
found that the Defendants’ awareness of the alleged violation, 
and whether they acted reasonably in response, presents a 
genuine dispute of a material fact.  Although the Court failed 
to make specific factual findings in its order, facts identified in 
is previous filings support its ruling that a factfinder could 
plausibly conclude the Defendants “must have known” of the 
risk to E.D.’s rights.  Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 748. 
 In a memorandum opinion deciding a motion to dismiss, 
the District Court cited E.D.’s allegations that the BCRC is a 
small facility and the staff has “frequent contact and 
interaction” with the detainees, which permitted the 
Defendants to observe Sharkey with E.D. and become aware 
of their intimate relationship.  Moreover, the Court cited E.D.’s 
claims that the relationship became “obvious” to the other 
detainees, motivating them to complain to the BCRC staff 
about Sharkey’s conduct.4  Regarding Supervisor Edwards, the 
                                                            
4 The District Court filed a memorandum opinion in response 
to a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Jeremiah Petry, an 
ICE deportation officer who worked at the BCRC. The Court 
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Court found that E.D. raised a triable issue of fact as to whether 
the policies at the BCRC created an unreasonable risk of sexual 
assault, whether Edwards was aware of that risk, and whether 
E.D.’s injury was the result of the purported deficient policies.  
To support this finding, the Court cited E.D.’s response to the 
summary judgment motion, in which she alleged Edwards “has 
oversight over everything in the program for the BCRC, 
including training,” and that the training consisted of Sharkey 
“going through documents and signing them.”  She further 
alleged that the sexual assault training, the curriculum of which 
Edwards approved, consisted of a printed-out slides that 
employees read independently before taking a quiz.  
 Based on these adaptations by the District Court, we 
agree there is enough evidence to support an inference that the 
Defendants knew of the risk facing E.D., and that their failure 
to take additional steps to protect her – acting in their capacity 
as either a co-worker or supervisor – “could be viewed by a 
factfinder as the sort of deliberate indifference” to a detainee’s 
safety that the Constitution forbids.  Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 749.  
We agree there is a genuine need for trial to determine whether 
the Defendants are liable, and that summary judgment was 
therefore properly denied.  See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW 
of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992)) (“In 
practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the ‘mere 
scintilla’ threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material 
fact, then the court cannot credit the movant’s version of events 
against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant’s 
evidence far outweighs that of its opponent”). 5 
                                                            
granted Petry’s motion with prejudice, finding that E.D. failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
5 In the order deciding the summary judgment motion, the 
District Court found that whether Sharkey’s co-workers 
retaliated against E.D. after she reported the offensive conduct 
and thereby violated her First Amendment rights was a genuine 
issue of material fact.  This ruling was not raised by the 
Defendants on appeal, rendering any objection to the Court’s 
findings waived. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provide that an appellant’s brief must contain “appellant’s 
contentions and the reasons for them.”  Fed. R. App. P. 
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V. Conclusion  
 Given that no final order has been issued with regard to 
Berks County, we do not have jurisdiction to review the 
decision to deny summary judgment in its favor.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s decision to deny qualified immunity 
for the individual Defendants, and therefore affirm the denial 
of their motion for summary judgment.  We will remand this 
case for trial so that the liability of the parties may be decided 
by a factfinder.   
 
                                                            
28(a)(9)(A).  We have held that the absence of any argument 
renders the issue waived.  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 
137, 162 (3d. Cir. 2008). See also United States v. DeMichael, 
461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006) (“An issue is waived unless 
a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue 
before this court.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Irizarry, 
341 F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An appellant who falls to 
comply with this requirement fails to preserve the arguments 
that could otherwise have been raised.”). 
  
SMITH, Chief Judge, concurring. 
 I join my colleagues’ sound reasoning in upholding 
the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity and 
dismissing the remainder of the appeal.  I write separately 
to highlight a concern with the structure of the order under 
review. 
When summary judgment has been denied on 
qualified immunity grounds, we have jurisdiction to 
“determine whether the facts identified by the District 
Court constitute a violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right.”  Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 
261 (3d Cir. 2003).  Here, the District Court addressed the 
summary judgment motion by issuing an order, 
unaccompanied by a supporting opinion.  Instead, the 
order included a lengthy footnote setting forth the District 
Court’s reasoning.  This “footnote order” practice is 
frequently employed by our colleagues in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and it is not my desire to interfere 
with a longstanding custom and practice of that district.  
Indeed, in my view, there is nothing inherently 
problematic with so-called “footnote opinions.”  In this 
case, however, the footnote neglects to identify a single 
undisputed fact, and provides only cursory discussion—
without reference to the evidence of record—to support 
the conclusion that disputes of material fact exist.   
Because Appellants have raised on appeal relatively 
narrow legal claims that are capable of resolution without 
the need to closely examine the nuances of the District 
Court’s fact-finding, I see no need to remand this matter 
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for a more comprehensive opinion.  Nonetheless, while the 
District Court provided just enough detail for us to render 
a decision in this case, it cannot be overlooked that 
perfunctory treatment of the factual record does not 
comport with the spirit of the supervisory rule that we 
announced in Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion, 313 
F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).  In Forbes, we observed that 
providing only “spare comments” in a qualified immunity 
denial “greatly hampered” our ability to conduct 
meaningful appellate review.  Id. at 148.  We therefore 
expressly set forth a rule applicable to all qualified 
immunity decisions:  “we . . . require the District Courts to 
specify those material facts that are and are not subject to 
genuine dispute and explain their materiality.”  Id. at 146. 
Forbes has been the rule of our Court for well over 
a decade and a half, and remains so for good reason.  A 
comprehensive and detailed summary judgment opinion, 
specifying those facts that are undisputed as well as those 
that are material and subject to genuine dispute, is vital—
and often essential—to our meaningful review on appeal.  
I write to underscore the continued importance that our 
judges attach to compliance with the Forbes rule, and to 
discourage cursory footnote treatment of the factual record 
in qualified immunity decisions.  
 
